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I. ABSTRACT 
 
It is well-recognized that it is easier for judges to enforce constitutional “neg-
ative rights” provisions than positive social and economic rights. This article fo-
cuses on the challenges of enforcing one specific positive right: the constitutional 
right of children to attend adequately funded schools. Our article tests on-the-
ground judicial implementation of education funding provisions against the gen-
eral theoretical framework of judicial interaction with the political branches de-
veloped by Katharine Young. We analyze how, in multi-year, multi-decision lit-
igation, constitutional court judges in the three jurisdictions we studied actively 
experimented with the challenging task of forcing, or enticing, reluctant legisla-
tive and executive branches into spending more on education—often against the 
backdrop of potential political retaliation. Focusing principally on Indonesia and 
the American states of Washington and Kansas, we found Young’s model helpful 
in describing how judges shifted their tactical and rhetorical approaches among 
“peremptory,” “managerial,” “experimentalist,” “conversational” and “deferen-
tial” modes of review. Our study confirms Varun Gauri’s and Daniel M. Brinks’ 
observation that “judges . . . craft their opinions with an eye on the likelihood of 
compliance . . . , the political reaction and its effect on the standing of the judi-
ciary.” These and other social scientists help explain why it is so difficult for 
courts to push the political branches to act, particularly when action requires 
higher taxes or a redirection of existing funds. We conclude that a court’s ap-
proach to judicial review of legislative and executive actions (or inaction) de-
pends on the judiciary’s institutional strength, the remedies sought, and the spe-
cific political context within which the judicial review occurs. The three courts 
we studied were catalysts in contentious, multi-year education finance cases that 
were ultimately successful, in significant part, because of the strong support for 




Social and economic rights are imbedded in constitutions worldwide. But le-
gal theorists and empirical researchers—to say nothing of politicians—have ob-
served that enforcement of these “positive rights” to government action on 
health, education, housing, economic security, and other social goals can be 
problematic. This article focuses on one positive constitutional right: the right of 
children to attend adequately funded schools. The goal of our study is to test on-
the-ground judicial implementation of education funding provisions against a 
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general theoretical framework developed by Katharine Young,1 and we also ap-
ply the empirical findings in studies edited by Varun Gauri and Daniel M. 
Brinks2 and by Malcolm Langford, Cesar Rodriguez-Garavito, and Julieta 
Rossi.3 Young’s framework and the above empirical studies suggest that when 
faced with the task of enforcing positive rights provisions that cost taxpayer dol-
lars, constitutional courts operate in several distinct modalities. Judges use dif-
ferent tactical and rhetorical approaches depending on their institutional strength, 
their specific political context, and the remedies being sought. In the words of 
Gauri and Brinks, “judges . . . craft their opinions with an eye on the likelihood 
of compliance . . . , the political reaction and its effect on the standing of the 
judiciary. . . .”4 Recent scholarship has also emphasized the importance of the 
catalytic role of the judiciary, emphasizing that the judicial branch is most suc-
cessful in implementing positive constitutional rights when court decisions rein-
force sociopolitical factors that independently pressure the executive and legis-
lative branches to act.5 
We examined the experience of three jurisdictions with judicial enforcement 
of pre-college education rights, looking in depth at judicial enforcement of con-
stitutional requirements for school funding in Indonesia and in and the American 
states of Washington and Kansas. We conclude that the model developed by 
Young is of great value in describing court actions and judicial interplay with 
other governmental branches. Specifically, we found the three constitutional 
courts we studied actively shifted back and forth among Young’s stances as they 
searched for ways to successfully entice, shame, or force recalcitrant legislators 
and executives to act. At the same time, the work of social scientists Gauri and 
Brinks; and Langford, Rodriguez-Garavito, and Rossi; is more useful for predict-
ing when a constitutional court will be a successful catalyst in the political pro-
cess of increasing school funding. 
In this article, we review recent theoretical literature and empirical studies that 
attempt to describe how constitutional courts6 enforce justiciable positive rights, 
 
 1 See Katharine G. Young, A Typology of Economic and Social Rights Adjudication: Ex-
ploring the Catalytic Function of Judicial Review, 8 INT’L J. CONST. L. 385 (2010); 
KATHARINE G. YOUNG, CONSTITUTING ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS (Oxford U. Press 2012). 
 2 See VARUN GAURI AND DANIEL M. BRINKS, COURTING SOCIAL JUSTICE: JUDICIAL 
ENFORCEMENT OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD 1, 1–38 (Cam-
bridge U. Press 2008). 
 3 See SOCIAL RIGHTS JUDGMENTS AND THE POLITICS OF COMPLIANCE (Malcolm Langford, 
Cesar Rodriguez-Garavito & Julieta Rossi, eds., Cambridge U. Press 2017) [hereinafter 
LANGFORD]. 
 4 GAURI & BRINKS, supra note 2, at 4. 
 5 See, e.g., CHARLES R. EPP, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: LAWYERS, ACTIVISTS, AND 
SUPREME COURTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 197 (U. Chicago Press 1998) (noting that 
“[t]he basic lesson of this study is that rights are not gifts: they are won through concerted 
collective action arising from both a vibrant civil society and public subsidy”). 
 6 In this article, when we use the term “constitutional courts,” we mean both appellate 
courts that are formally vested with authority to interpret or apply constitutional provisions, as 
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focusing particularly on Young’s theory as an analytical paradigm for our obser-
vations. Next, we detail specific instances of this type of judicial enforcement in 
the three jurisdictions of Indonesia, Washington, and Kansas—a civil law coun-
try and two common law states. The frameworks we apply help explain how 
constitutional courts that are thousands of miles from one another, with different 
judicial selection systems, different legal traditions, and different political cir-
cumstances, nevertheless address school finance controversies in remarkably 
similar ways. Although enforcement of positive rights can be a lengthy and often 
arduous process, strategic maneuvering by judges can result in substantial re-
sults. Each of the constitutional courts we studied moved among the modes 
Young identifies, experimenting with different enforcement approaches in an at-
tempt to discover what worked best in their specific contexts. Consistent with 
the social scientists’ theories, we found that despite legislative foot-dragging, 
these courts played a catalytic role in forcing school funding onto the politicians’ 
front burners while education interest groups and the media successfully pushed 
the lawmakers from other directions. 
 
III. CONCEPTUALIZING POSITIVE RIGHTS ENFORCEMEN T 
 
 A 2014 study by Courtney Jung, Ran Hirschl, and Evan Rosevear7 observed 
that, of 195 national constitutions in the world, 90% contain at least one eco-
nomic and social right,8 and 158 of those documents (70%) include at least one 
expressly justiciable economic and social right.9 There is substantial academic 
literature devoted to constitutional education rights around the world,10 including 
 
well as other high courts (e.g., “supreme courts”) that routinely construe or enforce constitu-
tions. 
 7 See Courtney Jung, Ran Hirschl & Evan Rosevear, Economic and Social Rights in Na-
tional Constitutions, 62 AM. J. OF COMP. L. 1043, 1050 (2014). See also SOCIAL RIGHTS 
JURISPRUDENCE: EMERGING TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW 3 (Malcolm 
Langford, ed., Cambridge U. Press 2008). The authors outline a collection of studies that co-
vers almost two thousand decisions on positive rights from twenty-nine jurisdictions. 
 8 Jung, supra note 7 at 1053. 
 9 Id. 
 10 See, e.g., Flavia Pivesan, Brazil: Impact and Challenges of Social Rights in the Courts, 
in SOCIAL RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE: EMERGING TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE 
LAW 182, 188–89 (Malcolm Langford, ed., Cambridge Univ. Press, 2008); Fernando Basch, 
Argentina: Enforcing a Legal Victory for University Access to Education (Case Study, Int’l 
Budget P’ship, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2926507 (last vis-
ited July 8, 2019); Education, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF SOUTH AFRICA (Stu Woolman & 
Michael Bishop, eds., 2d ed., Juta, 2014) §§ 57.1–57.2, 57-1–57-42; THE CONSTITUTION IN THE 
CLASSROOM: LAW AND EDUCATION IN SOUTH AFRICA 1994–2008 (Stu Woolman & Brahm 
Fleisch, eds., Pretoria U. L. Press, 2009); Cameron McConnachie & Chris McConnachie, Con-
cretising the Right to a Basic Education, 129 S. AFRICAN L. J. 554 (2012); Strategic Litigation 
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in the United States.11 As an empirical matter, these provisions tend to appear 
more frequently in civil law countries.12 However, Emily Zackin has documented 
the strong social and economic rights tradition at the state constitutional level in 
the United States,13 and, together with Mila Versteeg, has demonstrated that 
American’s national constitution is an oddity in its lack of positive rights as com-
pared with other national constitutions around the globe.14 Justiciability and ju-
dicial enforcement are quintessential for the practical implementation of these 
social and economic rights. Over the course of the past decade, there has been an 
increase in theoretical and empirical studies of court implementation of positive 
rights, providing fodder for a robust study of their actualization in jurisdictions 
where such rights are constitutionally guaranteed.15 
In the introduction to their 2017 study, social scientists Langford, Rodriguez-
Garavito, and Rossi provide an excellent way of organizing the wide variety of 
judicial approaches.16 They describe four clusters of systemic variables: legal 
variables like the nature and wording of a positive right; the types of litigants 
seeking enforcement; the available remedies; and the judicial culture and tradi-
tions of the jurisdiction; political variables like the ability and willingness of 
governments to implement court rulings; the relationships between the branches 
of government; the level of government involved; and whether a defendant is a 
 
Impacts: Equal Access to Quality Education, Open Society Justice Initiative (2017), available 
at: https://www.justiceinitiative.org/publications/strategic-litigation-impacts-equal-access-
quality-education [https://perma.cc/Q8WZ-848W] (last visited July 8, 2019) (discussing Bra-
zil, India, and South Africa); Bivitri Susanti, The Implementation of the Rights to Health Care 
and Education in Indonesia, in GAURI & BRINKS, supra note 2, at 224. 
 11 There is a massive and growing corpus of academic literature on school funding cases 
in the United States. See, e.g., Cathy Albisa & Amanda Shanor, United States: Education 
Rights and the Parameters of the Possible, in Langford, Rodriguez-Garavito & Rossi, supra 
note 3, at 255; Paula Lundberg, State Courts and School Funding: A Fifty-State Analysis, 63 
ALB. L. REV. 1101 (2000); William S. Koski, Beyond Dollars? The Promises and Pitfalls of 
the Next Generation of Educational Rights Litigation, 117 COL. L. REV. 1897 (2017); Julia A. 
Simon-Kerr & Robynn K. Sturm, Justiciability and the Role of Courts in Adequacy Litigation: 
Preserving the Constitutional Right to Education, 6 STAN. J. C. R. & C. L. 83 (2010). 
 12 Jung, Hirschl & Rosevear, supra note 7 at 1057–59. 
 13 EMILY ZACKIN, LOOKING FOR RIGHTS IN ALL THE WRONG PLACES: WHY STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS CONTAIN AMERICA’S POSITIVE RIGHTS 2 (Princeton U. Press 2013). 
 14 Mila Versteeg & Emily Zackin, American Constitutional Exceptionalism Revisited, 81 
U. CHICAGO L. REV. 1641 (2014). See also David Law & Mila Versteeg, The Declining Influ-
ence of the United States Constitution, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 762, 850 (2012) (suggesting that the 
U.S. Constitution is “becoming increasingly atypical by global standards” as other countries 
draft or redraft their constitutions in ways that do not follow the American model). 
 15 See, e.g., Kent Roach, The Challenges of Crafting Remedies for Violations of Socio-
economic Rights, in SOCIAL RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE: EMERGING TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL 
AND COMPARATIVE LAW 46 (Malcolm Langford ed., 2008); GAURI & BRINKS, supra note 2; 
LANGFORD, supra note 3; INT’L COMM. OF JURISTS, COURTS AND THE LEGAL ENFORCEMENT OF 
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: COMPARATIVE EXPERIENCES OF JUSTICIABILITY 
(2008). 
 16 LANGFORD ET AL., supra note 3, at 14–15. 
50 GA.  J. INT’L & COMP. L. [Vol. 49:45 
state or non-state actor; socio-economic variables like wealth and wealth dispar-
ity; social inequality; ethnic divisions; and public attitudes; and civil society var-
iables including the relationship between litigants, lawyers, and civil society co-
alitions; as well as access to litigation funding.17 
In her work, Katharine Young zeroes in on the variety of styles and approaches 
that constitutional courts apply in interacting with the executive and legislative 
branches when those courts attempt to enforce positive rights guarantees. In her 
2012 book, Professor Young describes five stances used by courts in social and 
economic rights cases. She notes that these stances should not be thought of in 
terms of strengths and weaknesses because judicial power is inherently “multi-




Young describes these modes of judicial review as follows: 
• Deferential Review, where “the court assumes that 
greater decision-making authority is placed on the 
elected branches in interpreting economic and social 
rights and in determining the obligations that arise.” 
• Conversational Review, in which “the court is instead 
reliant on the ability of an interbranch dialogue to re-
solve the determination of rights.” 
• Experimentalist Review, “whereby the court seeks to 
involve the relevant stakeholders—government, 
 
 17 Id. 
 18 YOUNG, supra note 1, at 142 fig. 5.1. 
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parties, and other interested groups—in solving the 
problem which obstructs a provisional benchmark of 
the right.” 
• Managerial review, which “occurs when the court as-
sumes a direct responsibility for interpreting the sub-
stantive contours of the right and supervising its pro-
tection with strict timelines and detailed plans.” 
• Peremptory Review, “when the court registers its supe-
riority in interpreting the rights, and in commanding 
and controlling an immediate response.”19 
Young’s characteristically erudite book details each of these approaches and 
provides examples of their use in various countries.20 She emphasizes the highly 
contextual nature of judicial responses to positive rights cases and demonstrates 
how the judicial approaches not only vary among jurisdictions but within indi-
vidual courts themselves. A specific constitutional court might assume one or 
more stances in a single case, or shift modes based on the efficacy of its inter-
action with the other branches of government. Young observes that effective 
courts have a keen awareness of their political capital in these cases, and that 
judges apply that capital differently in different systems and under different cir-
cumstances.21 One of the most effective concepts she uses is that of a “catalytic 
court . . . one that sees itself in productive interaction with other political and 
legal actors.”22 A catalytic court is successful at variously triggering, nudging, 
guiding, controlling, or mandating change that is already in process.23 Young 
further elaborates on her model, suggesting three overarching “role concep-
tions” that courts adopt: the “Detached Court” that emphasizes the deferential 
and conversational approaches; the “Engaged Court” that focuses on conversa-
tional and experimentalist review; and the “Supremacist Court” that takes a 
more managerial or peremptory stance.24 Her chart depicting these concepts fol-
lows:  
 
 19 Id. at 142. 
 20 See generally id. at 143–66 (explaining the approaches toward judicial review and 
providing examples that typify each approach in praxis). 
 21 Id. at 172. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. at 173–74. 
 24 YOUNG, supra note 1, at 194 fig. 7.1. 
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25 
Young’s book applies these concepts in detail to the implementation of so-
cial and economic rights in South Africa (the catalytic approach),26 Colombia 
(the judicial supremacy approach),27 India (the “engaged court” approach),28 and 
the United Kingdom (the detachment approach).29 She demonstrates how, in 
choosing and applying their stances, courts strategically interact with other key 
players in government and in civil society.30 
The empirical work of Gauri and Brinks31 complements the theories and 
research of Katharine Young, and Langford, Rodriguez-Garavito, and Rossi.32 
Gauri and Brinks focus on social and economic rights litigation in developing 
countries, and their book documents how courts actively interact with the polit-
ical branches with an eye towards effective results. They write that “judges . . . 
craft their opinions with an eye on the likelihood of compliance . . . , the political 
reaction and its effect on the standing of the judiciary . . . , and the existence of 
 
 25 YOUNG, supra note 1, at 194. 
 26 Id. at 176. 
 27 Id. at 197. 
 28 Id. at 203–04. 
 29 Id. at 206. 
 30 Id. at 195–96. 
 31 GAURI & BRINKS, supra note 2. 
 32 LANGFORD ET AL., supra note 3. 
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a strong litigant who can engage in follow up or bring new cases.”33 Gauri and 
Brinks contend that courts address more positive rights claims when the litigants 
are “well-organized and well-funded” and that courts are “more effective when 
working within, rather than against, the dominant currents in the political and 
policy environments.”34 Based on their research and that of other authors in their 
book, they conclude that courts acting in this manner “remain pro-majoritarian 
actors” and are “more effective when they act well within the political main-
stream and with substantial support from other political actors.”35 
This article endeavors to detail how constitutional courts acted and inter-
acted in three jurisdictions with respect to a single category of positive rights—
constitutional rights to adequate funding of pre-college education. The three ju-
risdictions on which we focus, Indonesia, Washington, and Kansas, all have pro-
visions either written or interpreted as “strong rights” that the courts consider 
judicially enforceable. We observed all three courts shifting their tactical ap-
proaches as they encountered executive and legislative resistance, sometimes 
acting deferentially, sometimes engaging in a “conversation,” and at other times 
taking “strong court” positions, including “peremptory” actions. As predicted 
by Gauri and Brinks, as well as by Langford, Rodriguez-Garavito, and Rossi, 
we found that the courts played a catalytic role, with the ultimate success of 
school funding litigation dependent on action by civil society groups, the media, 
and supporters within the legislative and executive branches. The problem was 
real. The political capital to fix the problem was present. The only thing needed 





Each branch of government appoints three of the nine justices on Indone-
sia’s Constitutional Court.36 Members must be 55 years old, are appointed to 
five-year terms with a maximum of fifteen years total, and must retire at 70 years 
 
 33 GAURI & BRINKS, supra note 2, at 4. 
 34 Id. at 25–26. 
 35 Id. at 28. 
 36 STEFANUS HENDRIANTO, LAW AND POLITICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS: INDONESIA 
AND THE SEARCH FOR JUDICIAL HEROES 55 (Routledge, 2018). 
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of age.37 The Court selects its Chief Justice.38 The Constitutional Court reviews 
statutes for their constitutionality, settles disputes between state institutions, set-
tles general election disputes, decides on the dissolution of political parties, and 
decides if grounds for impeachment exist.39 Statutory challenges are brought 
before the Court by citizens individually or public interest groups.40 The Court 
can declare a law unconstitutional and void, but it cannot dictate revisions to the 
national legislature.41 A separate Supreme Court hears appeals from the general 
court system.42 
The drafters of Indonesia’s 1999–2002 constitutional amendments provided 
for a number of social and economic rights and the Constitutional Court has 
addressed many of these provisions in litigation brought since 2003.43 Article 
31 (4), the education funding provision with which this article is concerned, in-
cludes a very specific directive that “the state shall prioritize the educational 
budget by allocating at least twenty percent of the state revenues and expendi-
tures budget and of the regional revenues and expenditures budget in order to 
meet the needs for organizing national education.”44 While this is a strong pro-
vision that lends itself readily to enforcement, we found that in six cases the 
Court interpreted, applied, and enforced that provision in a variety of ways, tak-
ing most of the available stances that Young describes. 
We analyzed six education funding decisions of Indonesia’s Constitutional 
Court between 2005 and 2008, all brought under the provision requiring the state 
 
 37 Id. at 56 (citing The Constitutional Court Act of 24/2003, art. 22, amended by the Con-
stitutional Court Act of 8/2011 and further updated by The Constitutional Court Act of 
7/2020). See also, UNDANG-UNDANG DASAR NEGARA REPUBLIK INDONESIA TAHUN  
[CONSTITUTION] 1945, art. 24C(3). The 2020 adjustments to the statute lengthened terms and 
further insulated Constitutional Court justices from removal by elected officials. 
 38 UNDANG-UNDANG DASAR NEGARA REPUBLIK INDONESIA TAHUN [CONSTITUTION] 1945, 
art. 24(c)(4) (Indon.). The Constitutional Court Law has limited the terms of the Chief Justice 
and Deputy Chief Justice to two-and-a-half years. The Constitutional Court Act of 24/2003, 
Art. 4(3) (Indon.). HENDRIANTO, LAW AND POLITICS, supra note 36, at 56. 
 39 UNDANG-UNDANG DASAR NEGARA REPUBLIK INDONESIA TAHUN [CONSTITUTION] 1945, 
art. 24(c)(1) (Indon.). Of these five responsibilities, the new court has dealt mainly with judi-
cial review and settling general election disputes. 
 40 The Constitutional Court Act of 24/2003, Art. 51, amended by The Constitutional Court 
Act of 8/2011 (Indon.). 
 41 The Majelis Permusyarwaratan Rakyat, or People’s Consultative Assembly (“MPR”) is 
comprised of two houses: the dominant Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat or People’s Representative 
Council (“DPR”), equivalent to a house of representatives, and the Regional Representative 
Council (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah or “DPD”), a “senate” with more limited powers that 
represents regional interests. 
 42 UNDANG-UNDANG DASAR NEGARA REPUBLIK INDONESIA TAHUN [CONSTITUTION] 1945, 
art. 31(4) (Indon.). 
 43 A list of many of the Constitutional Court’s decisions is available at HENDRIANTO, LAW 
AND POLITICS, supra note 36, at xii–xv. 
 44 UNDANG-UNDANG DASAR NEGARA REPUBLIK INDONESIA TAHUN [CONSTITUTION] 1945, 
art. 31(4) (Indon.). 
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to prioritize twenty percent of its budget for education.45 The push for meeting 
the constitutional funding mandate was backed by established teachers’ and civil 
society groups such as the Indonesian Teachers Association (PGRI) and 
Nahdlatul Ulama, the largest Muslim association in Indonesia (PB NU).46 The 
first judicial review of the new right to education funding was brought by teach-
ers and education activists in Education Funding I.47 They questioned the con-
stitutionality of the legislative act elucidating and implementing the education 
funding provision of the National Education Law.48 That statute proposed to 
gradually increase the pre-university portion of the state and local education 
budgets to the required twenty percent.49 The Court in a split decision ruled that 
“the 1945 Constitution had expressly determined that an education budget of a 
minimum 20% must be prioritized in national and regional budgets, and that 
could not be put aside by legislation.”50 They further stressed that “the imple-
mentation of this provision [Article 31 (4)] should not be delayed.”51 In its rul-
ing, the Court declared that because the National Education System Act was 
inconsistent with the Constitution, it did not have legally binding force.52 Three 
Justices53 dissented, stating that “the word ‘incrementally’ in Article 49 of the 
statute should not be seen as contradicting Article 31 (4) of the Constitution.”54 
The majority in Education Funding I reflected a strong judicial approach that 
typifies Young’s “peremptory review.” She describes the model as “closer to 
the conventional static model of judicial review that invites either the striking 
down of legislation or the upholding of it.”55 That is precisely what the 
 
 45 There had been at least seven petitions submitted based on Art. 31 (4) of the 1945 Con-
stitution. See VERI JUNAIDI, ET AL., THIRTEEN YEARS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT’S WORK 
IN JUDICIAL REVIEW 28 (2016). 
 46 Putusan Landmark Mahkamah Konstitusi 2003–2007 [Landmark Decisions of the Con-
stitutional Court] 197–98 (2017). Support for increased pre-college education funding came 
early from establishment entities and individuals, such as Rector Suyanto of Yogyakarta State 
University (UNY). Anggaran Pendidikan Tidak Sesuai Dengan UUD [Budget for Education 
is Not in Line with the Constitution], NU ONLINE (Jan. 10, 2004), 
https://www.nu.or.id/post/read/1110/alokasi-anggaran-pendidikan-tidak-sesuai-dengan-uu. 
 47 Decision of the Constitutional Court No. 011/PUU-III/2005, https://perma.cc/V568-
VW2Y. The labels attached to various cases in this article are simply a matter of convenience. 
The cases discussed were provided with different sobriquets in other studies. See, e.g., 
HENDRIANTO, supra note 36, 114–16; Andy Omara, Protecting Economic and Social Rights in 
a Constitutionally Strong Form of Judicial Review: The Case of Constitutional Review by the 
Indonesian Constitutional Court (2017) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wash-
ington) (on file with Gallagher Law Library, University of Washington). 
 48 Act on National Education System 20/2003 (Indon.). 
 49 Decision of the Constitutional Court No. 011/PUU-III/2005, supra note 47, p. 101. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. at 102–03. 
 53 Justice Natabaya, Justice Achmad Roestandi, and Justice Soedarsono, id. at 103. 
 54 Id. at 105. 
 55 YOUNG, CONSTITUTING ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS, supra note 1 at 162. 
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Indonesian court did in Education Funding I: it not only declared that Article 49 
(1) of the Education Funding Act was inconsistent with the Constitution, but 
went further by declaring the law void.56 The ruling invited no “dialogue” with 
the legislative branch; nor did it elaborate on how lawmakers should implement 
its result. This was a powerful mode of judicial decision-making, relying on the 
“the 1945 Constitution expressis verbis” mandating the minimum twenty per-
cent.57 The immediate effect of this ruling was that the Article 49 (1) of the 
National Education System Act could not be implemented as written. This ap-
parently meant the government was required to fulfill the twenty percent budget 
for education at once, but that did not happen. The government responded by 
increasing the education budget to six percent in the next annual budget,58 a far 
cry from the mandated twenty percent.   
The government’s minimal response to Education Funding I triggered an-
other petition from teachers and activists. They challenged the constitutionality 
of the legislature’s budget action in Education Funding II,59 arguing that the 
lawmakers’ response was nowhere close to the constitutionally required mini-
mum. The government countered that it had to consider the budgetary needs for 
other public services.60 In another split decision, the Court ruled that the updated 
budget law was inconsistent with the Constitution.61 This time, however, the 
Court did not declare the law legally void. The majority instead attempted to be 
more strategic. It considered the practical consequences of invalidating the 
budget and acknowledged that increasing the budgetary allocation for education 
meant reducing the allocation for other sectors, thereby creating a situation rife 
with “legal uncertainty.”62  
The Court’s ruling in this second education case reflected a weaker form of 
judicial review based on the justices’ recognition that a direct order to the coor-
dinate branches had fallen flat. Instead, the Court declared that the statute was 
inconsistent with the Constitution but declined to invalidate the law.63 The Court 
was trying a more “conversational” approach, attempting to engage the legisla-
tive branch and giving lawmakers the opportunity to adjust the law. In this more 
 
 56 Decision of the Constitutional Court No. 011/PUU-III/2005, https://perma.cc/V568-
VW2Y. 
 57 UNDANG-UNDANG DASAR NEGARA REPUBLIK INDONESIA TAHUN [CONSTITUTION] 1945, 
art. 31(4) (Indon.). 
 58 Law 36/2004 increased the budget for education to six percent of the total. Law 36/2004 
on the 2005 State Budget. 
 59 Decision of Constitutional Court No. 12/PUU-III/2005, available at: [https://perma.cc/ 
N96S-QA8A] (Indonesian original). 
 60 Id. at 38. 
 61 Id. at 61. 
 62 Id. at 62. 
 63 Decision of Constitutional Court No. 12/PUU-III/2005. 
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politically sensitive ruling, the court did not set a deadline or demand a plan.64 
Effectively, the Court’s decision bounced the ball back into the legislature’s 
court. 
Indonesia’s lawmakers responded by nudging the budget allocation from 
6% to 9.1% in its 2006 appropriation bill—a 50% increase but still far less than 
the constitutionally mandated minimum.65 In response, teachers and other civic 
action groups once again challenged the 2006 budget law as unconstitutional 
(Education Funding III).66 In another split decision, the Court ruled for the pe-
titioners, confirming that the allocation of 9.1% for education was not in line 
with Article 31 (4).67 The majority held that the government should transfer sur-
plus amounts in the state budget to the education budget.68 The Court was now 
experimenting from the bench—trying something different to push the execu-
tive and legislature forward after prior attempts had failed to catalyze change. In 
Stefanus Hendrianto’s words, “the Court refused to declare the Budget Law 
2006 unconstitutional but instead issued a directive for the Executive to do 
something to fulfill its constitutional mandate.”69 This declaration could be 
viewed as an “experimentalist” strategy, putting pressure on the parties (or at 
least one of them) to come up with a solution.70 But the Court’s approach this 
time around is best understood as a manifestation of Young’s “managerial” 
mode: the Court was directing a specific solution by advising a specific remedy, 
in this case the movement of funds from the government’s surplus into the 
budget for education spending.71 
Both the legislature and the executive ignored the Court’s directive to move 
 
 64 Applying Philip Bobbitt’s paradigm, the Indonesian Court in Education Funding II 
could be said to have suddenly shifted to a more “prudential” approach, weighing the relative 
advantages and disadvantages of invalidating the law in a broader political and economic con-
text. PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12 (Blackwell, 1991). 
 65 Law 13/2005. 
 66 Decision of the Constitutional Court No. 026/PUU-III/2005, available at: [https:// 
perma.cc/HB57-3NCN] (Indonesian original). 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. at 86. Two justices concurred (Palguna and Soedarsono), and two dissented (Roes-
tandi and Natabaya). The two concurring Justices took the position that only lecturers and 
teachers were appropriate petitioners. One of the dissenters, Justice Roestandi, contended that 
the current budget for education, which was less than 20 percent, did not necessarily mean that 
it was inconsistent with the constitution. He suggested that the current budget for education 
should be left in place and that it “could be increased in the next annual budget.” The other 
dissenter, Justice Natabaya, wrote that the budget law was a special law that did not directly 
bind the public at large. As a result, the petitioners did not have legal standing to file this 
petition to the court. Id. at 97–98. 
 69 HENDRIANTO, LAW AND POLITICS, supra note 36, at 114–15. 
 70 YOUNG, CONSTITUTING ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS (2012), supra note 1, at 150. 
Decision of the Constitutional Court No. 026/PUU-III/2005 (Indon.), supra note 66, at 86. 
 71 YOUNG, CONSTITUTING ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS (2012), supra note 1, at 155. 
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surplus funds to education spending,72 and this inaction precipitated in a 2006 
petition challenging the education allocation in Indonesia’s 2007 state budget, 
which had increased the allotment for schools only to 11.8%.73 This time around, 
in Education Funding IV,74 the Court unanimously declared the 2007 budget 
unconstitutional, holding that the 20% mandate must be fulfilled immediately.75 
However, the Court deferred invalidating the entire budget law, proposing in-
stead that the legislature could adjust the appropriation to bring it in line with 
constitutional requirements.76 With Education Funding IV, we witnessed Indo-
nesia’s Constitutional Court trying again to persuade lawmakers to “do the right 
thing,” recognizing the judiciary’s limited powers over coordinate branches.77 
The Court was also receiving pushback from the executive branch, which ex-
pressed concern about the trade-offs between education and other key govern-
ment services.78 The Court ratcheted down from Young’s “peremptory” and 
“managerial” modes to a combination of the “experimentalist” and “conversa-
tional” approaches.79 The Court did not order action, as it might have done in 
the two “supremacist” modes, but rather pointed out the failings of the elected 
branches and asked them to devise a solution thereto.  
In 2007, the Court received another similar case. There, a number of educa-
tional professionals challenged Article 49 (1) of Law 20/2003 in the National 
Education System (Education Funding V).80 In this case, the majority held that 
“Article 31 Paragraph (4) of the 1945 Constitution does not explain in detail 
everything included in the scope of the education budget of twenty percent 
 
 72 HENDRIANTO, LAW AND POLITICS, supra note 36, at 115. 
 73  Decision of the Constitutional Court No. 26/PUU-IV/2006, available at: 
[https://www.mkri.id/public/content/persidangan/putusan/putusan_sidang_Putusan026PUU-
IV06ttgAPBN2007tgl010507.pdf] (Indonesian original). 
 74 Decision of the Constitutional Court 026/PUU-IV/2006, available at: [https://perma.cc 
/8CWM-N5JE] (Indonesian original). 
 75 Id. at 93, 95. 
 76 Id. at 94. (Translation by HENDRIANTO, LAW AND POLITICS, supra note 36, at 115.) 
 77 HENDRIANTO, supra note 36, at 115. 
 78 KOMPAS DAILY NEWS, June 9, 2006, p. 12. “Vice President Jusuf Kalla stated that the 
fulfillment of a 20 percent budget for education is a dilemma for the government. He further 
explains, ‘Teacher salaries will likely increase but there will be no sufficient budget for road 
maintenance, and teachers cannot get decent health service, and the police and army cannot 
property maintain law and order. That is the consequence if we fulfill 20 percent at once to-
day.’” 
 79 See YOUNG, supra note 1, at 147, 150. 
 80 Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia [Constitutional Court] 2007, NO. 24/PUU-
V/2007, https://mkri.id/public/content/persidangan/putusan/putusan_sidang_eng_Putusan 
%2024-PUU-V-2007%20_Eng_.pdf. See also Omara, supra note 47, at 160 (labeling this case 
“National Education System II” because it was a challenge to the education statute generally 
rather than the budget); HENDRIANTO, supra note 36, at 115 (referring to the decision as “Na-
tional Education Budget IV.”). 
2021] CATALYTIC COURTS  59 
. . . .”81 The Court declared that “educators’ salaries must be fully considered in 
the preparation of the education budget.”82 The majority observed that the gov-
ernment failed to implement the Court’s earlier education funding directives and 
predicted that “there would be a continuous violation if the Court consistently 
applied the same rules, i.e. excluding the educator salary, in calculating the 
budget for education.”83 But instead of consistently excluding the educators’ 
salaries as a component of the education budget, the Court acted strategically by 
granting the petition and explicitly including teachers’ salaries as one of the ed-
ucation budget items.84 After this move, the majority stated quite frankly that 
“there was no reason for the government to delay its constitutional duty to 
achieve 20 percent budget for education. Justice delayed, justice denied.”85 
In Education Funding V, the Court acted strategically to narrow the gap 
between the twenty percent constitutional requirement and the adopted budget-
ary allocation for education. It considered the government’s difficulty in ful-
filling the twenty percent appropriation requirement and the possibility of con-
tinued violations. The judges set the groundwork for a somewhat more 
deferential mode of jurisprudence, while attempting to cover their doctrinal 
tracks by declaring the inviolability of the Constitution’s twenty percent man-
date. In this decision, we see the Court taking a prudential approach, balancing 
the political and economic consequences of its rulings, and weighing the costs 
and benefits of its decision in a broader political and economic context. 
  In one important respect, the combination of lobbying, repeated litigation, and 
the Court’s various attempts to strategically develop an effective approach finally 
proved fruitful. The 2008 budget law provided 15.6% for education86—a distinct 
increase from the 6% appropriated just four years before.87 But 15.6% still falls 
short of 20%, and the difference led to yet another round of litigation, this time 
apparently resulting in the downfall of the highly respected Chief Justice, Jimly 
Asshiddiqie.88 In this sixth petition, the Indonesian Teacher Association (PGRI) 
challenged the constitutionality of the 2008 national budget (Education Funding 
 
 81 Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia [Constitutional Court] 2007, NO. 24/PUU-
V/2007, [3.16.4] https://mkri.id/public/content/persidangan/putusan/putusan_sidang_eng_Put 
usan%2024-PUU-V-2007%20_Eng_.pdf. 
 82 Id. at [3.16.8]. 
 83 Id. at [3.16.9]. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Law 45/2007 on the 2008 National Budget (Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara) 
Art. 1 (33), (36) (Indon.) and General elucidation of Law 45/2007. Law 45/2007 excludes 
teachers’ salaries in calculating budget for education. 
 87 See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
 88 See infra notes 89-92 and accompanying text. 
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VI).89 The Court’s opinion recounted its prior rulings on the issue since 200590 
and noted that lawmakers had repeatedly ignored judicial declarations about the 
Constitution’s mandate, stating that:  
[T]he Court has given enough time for the lawmakers to establish 
a law that guarantee the fulfillment of budget for education as 
mandated by the Constitution. Therefore, for the sake of uphold-
ing the Constitution as the highest law . . . the Court must declare 
that the 2008 Law on National Budget was inconsistent with the 
Constitution. 91  
  The opinion found the lawmakers responsible for these repeated constitutional 
violations and demanded that the 2009 budget allocate sufficient funds to the 
nation’s education system to meet the full constitutional requirement.92 But the 
Court, clearly recognizing the practical realities implicated, allowed the under-
funded 2008 budget to stand until the 2009 national budget cycle took effect.93 
The Court then warned that it would invalidate the entirety of the national 
budget if the 2009 budget proposal failed to meet the constitutional requirement 
for education funding.94 What we witnessed here was the Court’s frustration 
with its earlier approaches, which were partly—but not sufficiently—successful 
at causing the legislative and executive branches to comply with a rather explicit 
positive right in Indonesia’s Constitution. In this sixth case, the Court shifted 
away from Young’s deferential and conversational modes toward a more man-
agerial approach. At the same time, we surmise that the justices likely believed 
that by leaving the 2008 budget in place and handing the solution to legislators, 
the judiciary was being sufficiently pragmatic and cooperative.  
The results of Education Funding VI were mixed. The good news was that 
the 2009 national budget finally reflected a twenty percent allocation to educa-
tion—with the accomplishment of the constitutional mandate assisted by includ-
ing teachers’ salaries in the calculation. The not so good news, at least from the 
standpoint of Chief Justice Asshiddiqie and his supporters, was that President 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono appointed new justices,95 who in turn caused As-
shiddiqie’s removal as Chief Justice. Asshiddiqie, who soon resigned from the 
 
 89 Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia [MKRI] [Constitutional Court of the Repub-
lic of Indonesia] 13/PUU-VI/2008,  https://perma.cc/4ABK-TMJ4. 
 90 The four rulings are Court Decision No. 12/PUU-III/2005, supra note 59; Court Deci-
sion No. 026/PUU-III/2005 supra note 66; Court Decision No. 026/PUU-IV/2006, supra note 
74; and Court Decision No. 24/PUU-V/2007, supra note 80. 
 91 MKRI 13/PUU-VI/2008, supra note 89 at 100. 
 92 MKRI 13/PUU-VI/2008, supra note 89 at 101. 
 93 Id. at 101. 
 94 Id. at 100–01. 
 95 HENDRIANTO, LAW AND POLITICS, supra note 36, at 157. 
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Court altogether,96 suspected that the change in Court composition and superin-
tendence was engineered in reprisal for his leadership in the strongly worded 
Education Funding VI opinion.97 In Hendrianto’s analysis, the “Court had re-
strained itself in the previous [budget] cases, but in the end, Asshiddiqie failed 
to make a prudential judgment and initiated unnecessary confrontation with the 
government.”98 
In multiple education funding cases, the Indonesian Constitutional Court 
recognized its catalytic role and ardently searched for the “right” strategy to push 
the coordinate branches into constitutional compliance. We witnessed the Indo-
nesian court trying virtually all of the available modes that Young described, 
experimenting with each one and hoping for a successful result. However, inso-
far as each approach prompted a different reaction from the coordinate branches 
of the Indonesian government, it is difficult to definitively conclude which judi-
cial stance worked “best.”  
Despite no shortage of setbacks, the litigants and the Court kept pushing, 
and the legislative and executive branches gradually came into compliance (or 
at least “good enough” compliance). This implementation of a positive right 
mandate within a half dozen years is impressive. At the same time, the result 
was costly in another way—a significant shake-up in Indonesia’s Constitutional 
Court had substantial collateral impacts in other cases.99 The institutional ten-
sion between the court on the one hand and the executive and legislative 
branches on the other appears to have been a direct result of the fact that fully 
funding pre-college education costs money—a lot of money. Although the ex-
ecutive and legislative branches gradually increased school funding in substan-
tial amounts, some were resentful of being pressured so directly by the judiciary, 
and this had serious repercussions for the Constitutional Court.100  
 
V. WASHINGTON STATE 
 
A distinctive feature of American state constitutionalism is that many state 
constitutions are interpreted by elected judges.101 In most states, judges are ei-
ther directly elected, or appointed but then required to stand either for reelection 
 
 96 Id. at 159. 
 97 Id. at 115–16, 157–58. 
 98 Id. 
 99 The impact of Asshiddiqie’s removal as Chief Justice and his subsequent resignation 
from the Court comprises a major portion of Hendrianto’s book. See HENDRIANTO, supra note 
36, at 105. It is also reflected in Omara’s analysis of later changes in the Court’s mode of 
judicial behavior and analysis. See Omara, supra note 47. 
 100 See, notes 60 and 78, and accompanying text. 
 101 G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 122 (1998). 
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or for voter approval in a “retention election.”102 As discussed below, this fea-
ture of America’s state judicial selection puts pressure on judges when they 
make constitutional rulings disliked by certain political actors or groups.103 
Washington State is typical in having an elected State Supreme Court.104 
Like many American state courts, Washington’s Supreme Court does not hesi-
tate to strike down statutes it finds violative of constitutional provisions.105 But 
Washington’s constitutional school funding cases encountered considerably 
more difficulties in implementation, bringing “the court into protracted conflict 
with other branches and with organized political groups.”106 
Washington State has one of the strongest constitutional mandates for pre-
college (“K-12”) education in the United States. Eleven states require the provi-
sion of a “thorough and efficient” system of public schools,107 and several others 
mandate a “general and uniform system” of public schools.108 Washington’s ro-
bust 1889 constitution provides far more substance, with Article IX, Section 1 
noting that “[i]t is the paramount duty of the state to make ample provision for 
the education of all children residing within its borders, without distinction or 
preference on account of race, color, caste, or sex.”109 The explicit nature of 
Washington’s constitutional language, designating “ample provision for . . . ed-
ucation” as the “paramount duty” of the state, is a distinguishing factor in Wash-
ington’s education funding caselaw. In other jurisdictions, litigation in the 1970s 
 
 102 For state-by-state summaries of judicial selection, see Methods of Judicial Selection, 
NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS., http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/methods/selectio 
n_of_judges.cfm?state= [https://perma.cc/G7HG-5FT4] (last visited April 4, 2019). Only a 
dozen American states appoint their highest appellate courts with no electoral participation. 
 103 See infra notes 158 and 214–215 and accompanying text. 
 104 WASH. CONST. art. IV, §3. 
 105 See, e.g., Dearle v. Frazier, 173 P. 35 (Wash. 1918) (noting that “[t]o give credit in 
public schools for study of historical, biographical, narrative, and literary features of Bible 
pursued under sectarian agents is to give credit for sectarian teaching and influence contrary 
to Const. art. 9, § 4.”); Culliton v. Chase, 25 P.2d 81 (Wash. 1933) (holding “graduated income 
tax statute . . . unconstitutional” because “[i]ncome is ‘property’ within Constitution requiring 
uniform taxation, and tax on income is tax on property and is not ‘excise tax.’”); State ex rel. 
Washington Toll Bridge Authority v. Yelle, 200 P.2d 467 (Wash. 1948) (adhering to the prin-
ciple that “[l]aws enacted in violation of constitutional provision that no bill should contain 
more than one subject, which should be expressed in title, will be declared void.”); Sofie v. 
Fibreboard Corp., 771 P.2d 711 (Wash. 1989) (holding that “[s]tatute placing limit on none-
conomic damages recoverable by personal injury or wrongful death plaintiff violates state 
constitutional right to trial by jury”). 
 106 Cornell W. Clayton & Gerry Alexander, Washington’s Constitution: The Politics of 
State Constitutional Interpretation, in GOVERNING THE EVERGREEN STATE: POLITICAL LIFE IN 
WASHINGTON 147 (Cornell W. Clayton et al. eds., Wash. St. Univ. Press ed. 2018). 
 107 See Molly A. Hunter, State Constitution Education Clause Language, EDUCATION 
JUSTICE (Jan. 2011), http://www.edlawcenter.org/assets/files/pdfs/State%20Constitution%20 
Education%20Clause%20Language.pdf. 
 108 Id. 
 109 WASH. CONST. art. IX, §§ 1 & 2 (emphasis added). 
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and 1980s relied on Equal Protection claims under the 14th Amendment110 and 
on arguments that school finance systems did not meet individual state consti-
tutional mandates for “adequate,” “thorough,” or “efficient” education.111 Na-
tionwide, American education finance litigation since the late 1980s has focused 
on the perceived “adequacy” of school funding under state constitutional re-
quirements.112 But Washington’s distinctive “paramount duty” provision gener-
ated an atypically strong directive in the Washington Supreme Court’s 1978 
case, Seattle School District v. State.113 
Seattle School District resulted from two failed attempts by Seattle’s school 
district to obtain local voter approval of a special tax levy for the fiscal year 
1975–1976.114 Upon review of the case, the Court first underscored its “ultimate 
power to interpret, construe and enforce” the state constitution.115 It then held 
that despite the state’s argument to the contrary, Article IX, Section 1 of Wash-
ington’s constitution was a mandatory, “judicially enforceable affirmative 
duty,”116 a duty that was “supreme, preeminent or dominant.”117 The opinion 
held that education funding could not rely on local tax revenues,118 but instead 
the state government was obligated to amply provide for basic education costs 
through “dependable and regular tax sources.”119 
In Seattle School District, Washington’s Supreme Court firmly asserted its 
authority to define the constitutional positive right to ample education funding 
and to broadly outline the appropriate legislative response, exhibiting aspects of 
Young’s “supremacist” judicial approach. But the court backed away from su-
pervising the legislature. Instead it took what Young might label an “experimen-
talist” tack, leaving to the lawmakers the responsibility of solving the problem. 
In other words, the Court exhibited tough talk but deferred the solution to the 
legislators. This judicial tactic was perhaps due to the vehemence of the state’s 
argument that school funding was at root a political question, coupled with the 
Washington court’s inexperience with enforcing a strong positive rights provi-
sion. The Washington legislature did proceed to develop a clear definition of 
“basic education” and substantially increased state funding. The legislators had 
 
 110 Simon-Kerr & Sturm, supra note 11, at 90–92; Koski, supra note 11, at 1902–03; Peter 
Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School Finance Reform, 48 VAND. L. 
REV. 101, 125–26 (1995). 
 111 Simon-Kerr & Sturm, supra note 11, at 92–94. 
 112 Koski, supra note 11, at 1904–05. 
 113 Seattle Sch. Dist. v. State, 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978). 
 114 Id. at 78. 
 115 Id. at 83. 
 116 Id. at 85–87, 91 (in his majority opinion, Justice Stafford expressly referred to and ap-
plied American legal philosopher Wesley Hohfeld’s conception of duties and correlative 
rights). 
 117 Id. at 91. 
 118 Id. at 99. 
 119 Seattle Sch. Dist. v. State, 585 P.2d at 97. 
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already defined basic education and revised local school funding in 1977,120 af-
ter the superior court ruling in Seattle School District but before the state su-
preme court’s decision.121 The legislators increased funding for public schools 
over the ensuing years, but increases were by no means consistent, due in part 
to a failure on the legislature’s part to account for inflation.122 
Washington’s basic educational model was adjusted over the years.123 
Pushed by educators, education lobbying groups, the press, and the public,124 
the legislature and a Commission on Student Learning it created in 1993125 de-
veloped more precise academic benchmarks126 and statewide assessment 
tests.127 The legislature also sponsored studies to determine the financial costs 
of bringing Washington students into compliance with those requirements, par-
ticularly with respect to the “Washington Learns” project mandated in 2005.128 
The Washington Learns report outlined specific actions to enable the bulk of 
Washington students to attain a level of academic preparedness for competition 
 
 120 Washington Basic Education Act of 1977, ch. 359, 1977 Wash. Sess. Laws 1606. 
 121 Daniel Stallings, Washington State’s Duty to Fund K-12 Schools: Where the Legislature 
Went Wrong and What it Should Do to Meet its Constitutional Obligation, 85 WASH. L. REV. 
575, 584 (2010). The 1977 enactment of the Basic Education Act seems to have had little 
impact on the court. However, Justice Utter, in his concurrence, stated that the court’s ap-
proach to enforcement should be limited “due to the vigor with which the legislature addressed 
its responsibility through the school finance legislation of 1977.” Seattle Sch. Dist. v. State, 
585 P.2d at 109–10. 
 122 Following the Seattle School District decision, Washington’s biennial state budgets for 
K-12 education increased in double-digit percentages from the 1979–1981 through the 1991-
1993 biennia. It then dropped to single digit increases in the biennia between 1993-1995 and 
2003-2005, then edging up again for two biennia (perhaps in response to the McCleary litiga-
tion). McCleary v. State of Wash., 173 Wash. 2d 477, 269 P.3d 227 (2012). In the 2009–2011 
biennium it declined precipitately, dropping by 2.6% in the 2009-2011 biennium when com-
pared with the previous biennium. Omnibus Operating Budgets 1979-81 Through 2019-21 
(Legislative Evaluation & Accountability Program Committee, June 6, 2019), available at 
https://perma.cc/KUT9-EJRJ. 
 123 Stallings, supra note 121, at 586–87. 
 124 Telephone interview with Ross Hunter, Secretary of the Washington State Department 
of Children, Youth, and Families and former legislator (July 17, 2019). 
 125 Basic Education Act of 1993, 1993 Wash. Sess. Laws 1293 (Ch. 336 §202(1)). 
 126 Stallings, Washington State’s Duty, supra note 121, at 585. These “Essential Academic 
Learning Requirements,” or EALRs, were mandated by the Basic Education Act of 1993, 1993 
Wash. Sess. Laws 1293 (Ch. 336 §202(3)(a)). 
 127 The Basic Education Act of 1993 also charged the Commission on Student Learning to 
develop an updated assessment system. Basic Education Act of 1993, 1993 Wash. Sess. Laws 
1293 (Ch. 336 §202(3)(b)). These “Washington Assessments of Student Learning, or 
WASL’s, were adjusted in the “Academic Achievement and Accountability Statute,” 1999 
Wash. Sess. Laws 2142 (Ch. 388). 
 128 The Comprehensive Education Study Steering Committee, popularly known as “Wash-
ington Learns,” was created by 2005 Wash. Sess. Laws 2277 (Ch. 496 §2). 
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in the modern knowledge and skills marketplace.129 Legislative sponsors of the 
study were fully aware that it might create the basis for new school funding 
litigation.130 In order to propel the state to move more swiftly in increasing its 
school funding allocations, Mathew McCleary et al. v. State of Washington was 
filed in January 2007 by parents, children, education advocacy groups, the 
teachers’ union, and a coalition of public school districts.131 At the time, the 
2007 legislature was already engaged in education system reforms.132 However, 
the primary action that year was the creation of yet another committee, the Basic 
Education Finance Task Force, to develop a comprehensive formula to finance 
the programs recommended by Washington Learns.133 The Task Force’s 2009 
report detailed the specific changes in education programing, staffing, and fund-
ing required to achieve the goals the legislature and its various commissions had 
set earlier for the state’s education system.134 The legislature responded by 
adopting a significant education reform bill redefining “basic education” and 
detailing minimum instructional offerings135 but it fell short of funding those 
reforms.136 This provided additional ammunition to the McCleary petitioners.137  
The McCleary petitioners contended that, notwithstanding the legislature’s 
repeated adoption of education standards and goals, the funding continued to 
fall short of the state’s paramount constitutional duty “to make ample provision 
for the education of all children.”138 In their petition, the McCleary plaintiffs 
raised issues concerning the constitutional meaning of “ample” funding and the 
word “education;” whether the state was complying with its legal duty as framed 
by these requirements; and what the courts ought to do to enforce that duty.139 
The trial court found that the state was out of compliance with its constitutional 
duty, and, relying heavily on the legislature’s own actions to establish minimum 
instructional offerings and funding allocations, held that state funding was “not 
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ample,” “not stable,” and “not dependable.”140  
The Washington Supreme Court substantially upheld the trial court’s deci-
sion. The Court’s opinion, written by Justice Debra Stephens, engaged in a self-
conscious discussion of positive and negative rights.141 She wrote that the “dis-
tinction between positive and negative constitutional rights is important because 
it informs the proper orientation for determining whether the State has complied 
with its . . . duty in the present case.”142 Justice Stephens quoted New York Uni-
versity Law Professor Helen Hershkoff,143 observing that while with negative 
rights the court’s inquiry would be whether the state had overstepped its bounds, 
with positive constitutional rights, a court “must ask whether the state action 
achieves or is reasonably likely to achieve ‘the constitutionally prescribed 
end.’”144 Stephens’ opinion then warned that cases under the education clause 
“have always proved difficult. If nothing else, they test the limits of judicial 
restraint and discretion by requiring the court to take a more active stance in 
ensuring that the State complies with its affirmative constitutional duty.”145 The 
opinion held that the legislature, through its commissions, studies, standards, 
and various statutes, had identified the resources needed to give all students an 
opportunity to meet those standards.146 “Yet substantial evidence shows that 
state allocations have consistently fallen short of the actual cost of implementing 
the basic education program.”147 The Court ruled that the state had failed in its 
constitutional duty to “make ample provision” for educating its children.148 The 
Court noted that the responsibility for devising the means of discharging the 
constitutional duty is best left with the legislature,149 but declined to entirely 
defer to the lawmakers, recognizing the danger that the legislature had already 
failed to meet this responsibility and may continue to fall short of the full ful-
fillment of its duties.150 Accordingly, the state supreme court retained jurisdic-
tion for oversight purposes, asked for “dialogue and cooperation between coor-
dinate branches of state government” in developing a funding reform program, 
and called upon the parties to prepare detailed proposals on how the state should 
go about meeting the constitutional mandate.151  
The Washington State Supreme Court thus positioned itself to engage in 
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what Young would call a “conversationalist” or “experimentalist” process with 
the legislature and the executive, looking for a give-and-take that would lead to 
an effective and substantial school funding program. But as it turned out, that 
conversation would continue for six and a half years, involving seven rounds of 
legislative action (or inaction), report-filing with the court, written and oral ar-
guments, and nine major court orders. Limited by its institutional customs, the 
Court found that it could “converse” with the state only through questions at oral 
arguments and subsequent judicial orders, and the inability of lawmakers to en-
gage in negotiations with the state judges frustrated members of the legisla-
ture.152 By all accounts, the process of enforcing the state’s constitutional man-
date proved far more onerous than the Court had initially anticipated.  
The fundamental problem the Washington Supreme Court encountered in 
enforcing the McCleary decision was that the state legislature responded slowly, 
in substantial part because of lawmakers’ unwillingness or inability to raise 
taxes. During most of the period between the initial McCleary judgment on Jan-
uary 5, 2012, and the court’s final order on June 7, 2018, the legislature was 
under divided political control, with the House of Representatives led by Dem-
ocrats and the Senate dominated by a Republican-led coalition.153 To the sur-
prise of no one, the two houses found it difficult to agree on funding solutions. 
Republicans were reluctant to raise taxes, and Democrats were loath to cut pro-
grams.154 Some Republican legislators retaliated against the Court, disinviting 
the Chief Justice from giving her customary “State of the Judiciary” address155 
and threatening to reduce the Court’s size.156 When in 2014 the Court held the 
state in contempt for failure to act expeditiously, and then in 2015 added a 
$100,000 per day penalty to spur legislative action, nineteen members of the 
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Senate Republican-controlled majority caucus collectively declared “[t]his ex-
traordinary order presents a clear threat to our state legislature as an institution,” 
violated the state and federal constitutions, and threatened a challenge under the 
federal “republican-form-of-government” clause.157 The following year there 
was a vigorous conservative challenge to three sitting justices, based primarily 
on their rulings in McCleary and other school funding cases. Notwithstanding 
the conservative barrage, all three judges received solid support from the elec-
torate, materially strengthening the Court’s hand going forward.158 
The back-and-forth between the legislature and the Court continued year 
after year, with the legislature resisting a complete solution, yet gradually in-
creasing funding under pressure from the judiciary and the public at large. Dur-
ing this process, the court earnestly (and impatiently) searched for a way to en-
force its orders, quizzing the parties about possible measures such as 
invalidating some or all tax exemptions, or invalidating the entire operating 
budget.159 This tug-of-war between the judiciary and the legislature lasted more 
than six years, with the state’s education budget slowly increasing until the pro-
cess finally concluded on June 7, 2018. In 2017, the legislature finally enacted 
a budget that substantially increased school funding. On June 7, 2018, the Court 
finally declared the case done, announced that the state had finally “complied 
with the Court’s orders to fully implement its statutory program of basic educa-
tion,” terminated jurisdiction, and lifted the contempt sanctions it had previously 
imposed in 2015.160 The plaintiffs and their supporters from the teachers’ union 
and civic groups were not entirely satisfied, arguing that the funding still fell 
short of the need and that the tax levy burdens had been unfairly distributed 
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among school districts within the state.161 Some legislators viewed the 2018 
school funding mechanism as somewhat ad hoc and observed that capital fund-
ing and special education issues had not been fully resolved.162 Nevertheless, 
the Court’s members concluded that they had pushed hard enough, given that 
between 2012 and 2019, the legislature had more than doubled the state’s budget 
for K–12 funding from $13.5 billion to $27.3 billion per biennium.163 
The McCleary process—however long, contentious, and messy it may have 
been—can be regarded as a success in enforcing positive rights. It took a sub-
stantial time, resources, and political capital and saw no shortage of political 
headaches. But ultimately the Court’s steady pressure—cajoling lawmakers, 
shaming them, speculating in orders about potential Draconian measures to seize 
public funds or shut the schools but always exercising restraint—turned out to 
be effective. The Court’s members understood that there were practical limits to 
judicial orders, with the danger that legislators would choose to ignore the 
court’s dictates. But the judiciary’s approach was aided substantially by con-
sistent support from the media and various civil society groups; by influential 
legislators who wanted to carry out the Court’s orders; and by the simple fact 
that when challenged at the polls for enforcing the state constitution’s education 
funding provision, the challenged incumbents all received public backing.164 In 
this regard, the Washington court was supremely catalytic. It deftly toggled back 
and forth among the approaches depicted by Katharine Young, exhibiting both 
conversational and managerial characteristics, and constantly experimented. 
Young characterizes the experimentalist approach as being one in which the 
court involves the stakeholders (the government, the parties, and other interested 
groups) in solving the problem.165 Washington’s justices were definitely 
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experimentalist when searching for an appropriate remedy for the chronic legis-
lative inaction with which they were confronted. Indeed, one legislator de-
scribed the Court’s behavior as “schizophrenic.”166 After each legislative ses-
sion, the Court requested briefings from the parties as well as amicus briefs and 
asked for guidance in oral arguments where the justices grilled the parties about 
the range of enforcement options.167 While this likely was an “experimentalist” 
quest for suggestions on the scope of the court’s enforcement powers, it served 
to heighten pressure on legislators to act. Once the court had decided how to 
proceed with respect to the latest update from the legislature, it would act man-
agerially. But all the while it asserted that it was actually being deferential and 
reiterated that specific solutions were up to the lawmakers or that the legislature 
and the commissions it created had already determined what it would take to 
“amply fund” basic education statewide. As reflected in the McCleary deci-
sion,168 oral arguments, and myriad judicial orders, the state justices were in-
tensely cognizant of the pitfalls in enforcing a positive rights provision that costs 
substantial taxpayer dollars. But this awareness helped them gradually develop 
a strategy of restraint with pressure that was eventually successful. Nevertheless, 
by slowly but surely increasing the pressure applied from the bench, the judici-




The Kansas Constitution’s education funding language differs from Wash-
ington State’s in a number of ways.169 However, the broad trajectory of Kansas 
school funding litigation resembles Washington’s experience, featuring a simi-
lar multi-year ping pong match between the state’s supreme court and legisla-
ture. The lengthy and tense interaction between the judicial and other branches 
has been carefully documented by University of Kansas Law Professor Richard 
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E. Levy and others.170 
Kansas selects justices through a merit selection process.171 Each time a va-
cancy occurs, a nonpartisan commission nominates three potential appointees 
for the governor, who selects one of them.172 The appointee must stand for voter 
approval at the next general election, and if retained, that justice is subject to 
periodic retention elections.173 Because Kansas historically has been Republican 
in its political leanings,174 the Kansas supreme court has been conservative in its 
outlook—though moderately so.175 As discussed below, the Kansas Supreme 
Court, in two clusters of cases over more than fifteen years, worked conscien-
tiously to enforce the state constitution’s education funding provision. In its ef-
forts, the Court encountered sharp resistance and barely veiled threats from 
some legislators. Nevertheless, the justices, spurred on by a strong showing of 
support from the media and the public at large, steadily pushed lawmakers to-
ward action on issues of school funding.  
The aforementioned litigation involved two key positive rights allocations 
in the state’s constitution. Article 6, Section 1 requires that the legislature “shall 
provide for intellectual, educational, vocational and scientific improvement” by 
establishing and maintaining public schools. Article 6, Section 6(b) provides 
that: “[t]he legislature shall make suitable provision for finance of the education 
interests of the state.”176 That “suitable provision” language was at the core of 
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the multi-year litigation to adequately fund Kansas schools.177 
Kansas school-funding litigation stretches back to 1991, when a district 
court ruled that the state’s funding system fell short of the constitutional man-
dates of adequacy and equity. 178 The court then postponed proceedings to ena-
ble the legislature to act. In 1992, legislators reorganized the state’s school fund-
ing system by adopting the School District Finance and Quality Performance 
Act (frequently referred to by the less than ideal acronym “SDFQPA”).179 Eight 
years later, consultants John Augenblick and John Meyers, commissioned by 
the state legislature, found Kansas was $800 million short of the amount needed 
for an adequate education system (the “A&M Study”).180 
The A&M Study was soon followed by the Montoy litigation, consisting of 
four state supreme court decisions between 2003 to 2006.181 Montoy I, in 2003, 
held that school funding lay with the legislature. However, after a trial on re-
mand, the district court ruled that Kansas’s school funding system violated con-
stitutional guarantees. The second, third, and fourth Montoy decisions followed 
in rapid succession, reacting to legislative attempts to address the Supreme 
Court’s holdings that state funding was insufficient.182 At one point, when Mon-
toy III’s court deadline for an additional $148 million appropriation passed with-
out legislative compliance, the court set a hearing to determine if the entire Kan-
sas school system should be closed.183 Emotions were running high, but the 
legislature blinked and approved the funds.184 After another legislatively com-
missioned study led to $466 million in increased funding over three years, the 
2006 case Montoy IV found that the increased appropriation substantially com-
plied with constitutional requirements.185 
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Richard E. Levy has artfully described how the Montoy saga and the Court’s 
interactions with lawmakers involved “a clash between two essential separation-
of-powers principles,” involving the legislature’s power to set educational pol-
icy and control taxes on the one hand, and the duty of the courts to interpret and 
apply the law on the other.186 Although the judiciary relied on the legislature’s 
own standards and definitions in reaching its conclusions,187 many lawmakers 
felt the court was usurping their power to oversee and manage the school sys-
tem188 and responded with unsuccessful proposals to amend the Kansas consti-
tution to trim the Supreme Court’s authority to direct the legislature to make 
appropriations.189 
The Montoy litigation closed with judicial acceptance of the legislature’s 
progress in boosting school funding. To this end, Richard Levy observed in a 
footnote that the title of his article—which included an allusion to the historic 
gunfight at the OK Corral—was somewhat misplaced because everyone was 
still standing at the end of the heated litigation.190 But as it turned out, the gun-
fight was not over at all; within four short years the guns would resume their 
blazing once more. 
After Montoy, two things happened that caused school funding cuts and re-
newed litigation. First, the “Great Recession” of 2007–2009 drastically reduced 
government revenues nationwide—an unfortunate phenomenon from which 
Kansas was by no means immune.191 Second, conservative Republicans de-
feated moderates in the 2010 and 2012 state primaries and a conservative Gov-
ernor was elected.192 Legislative cuts to the education budget resulted in a 2.61% 
decrease in per pupil funding from all sources in the 2009–2010 school year 
when compared with the prior year.193 The next year saw much of the same, as 
per pupil funding was once again slashed.194 This resulted in Gannon v. State, 
filed in November 2010 by a group of school districts, their students, and their  
guardians.195 
The Gannon case was referred to a panel of three trial judges, as required 
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by a Kansas statute on school funding litigation.196 Following a marathon, six-
teen-day trial, the panel held that the state was violating the Article VI funding 
requirements.197 Upon review, the Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the lower 
court’s ruling. Responding to the state’s argument that the level of school fund-
ing was a non-justiciable political question, the opinion discussed at length the 
fundamental duties of the judicial branch. It noted that the majority of state 
courts had held the constitutionality of school funding was justiciable, and went 
on to emphasize that “our Kansas Constitution clearly leaves to the legislature 
the myriad of choices available to perform its constitutional duty; but when the 
question becomes whether the legislature has actually performed its duty, that 
most basic question is left to the courts to answer under our system of checks 
and balances.”198  
Turning to the merits of the case, the Court explicitly adopted Kentucky’s 
factors from the 1989 case Rose v. Council for Better Education, Inc.199 for eval-
uating the constitutional adequacy of K–12 financing.200 After adopting the fac-
tors articulated by Rose, the Court sent the “adequacy” portion of the case back 
to the district court for further evaluation in light of the newly endorsed crite-
ria.201 The court also found that the legislature had violated the “equitable edu-
cation” requirement of the state constitution because of the disparities between 
rich and poor districts,202 and ordered the legislature to address the equity issue 
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ligently; and (vii) sufficient levels of academic or vocational skills to enable 
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no later than July 1, 2014.203 
What followed was five years of back-and-forth institutional dialogue and 
action between the Kansas Supreme Court and the coordinate branches of gov-
ernment. The sequence of events differed from Indonesia’s and Washington’s 
experience in its details, though many of the same basic themes were clearly 
observable. In this regard, it is truly striking how similar the big-picture story 
was in each jurisdiction: court decisions requiring increased school funding 
were followed by legislative action that fell short of the constitutional require-
ment. The inter-branch tension was even stronger in Kansas than in Indonesia 
or Washington. Some legislators complained vociferously that their authority 
was being usurped by the judiciary.204 In 2015, a conservative legislature and 
governor froze the state’s commitment of funds to local districts and back-
tracked on school levy equalization actions taken in 2014 with lower court ap-
proval.205 Legislators adopted a new “block grant” system for state aid to dis-
tricts. But in February 2016, the Court rejected that approach in Gannon II, 
where the Court was forced to explain to lawmakers that the school funding 
requirements originated with the people, whose will was expressed in a consti-
tution that courts were bound to enforce.206 The opinion also emphasized that 
the judiciary not only had the power declare a law unconstitutional, but also “the 
inherent power to enforce our holdings.”207 Nevertheless, the court stayed action 
to provide the legislature with an opportunity to correct the deficiencies. 
The legislature responded by restoring the earlier formula for state capital 
aid and new equalization assistance.208 But on May 27, 2016, the Court quickly 
ruled in Gannon III209 that although the legislature had made some progress in 
the capital funding area, certain inequities were accentuated and the legislation 
had still failed to comply with the Gannon I order.210 The Court stayed the issu-
ance of a mandate until June 30, 2016, to provide lawmakers with another op-
portunity to “to craft a constitutionally suitable solution.”211 Lawmakers in a 
special session provided additional equalization funds, and the state and Gannon 
plaintiffs stipulated that the constitutional equity issues were resolved. The 
Court promptly approved that agreement, leaving the adequacy issues for later 
resolution.212 
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The firm stance of  the judiciary in the first Gannon cases highlighted the 
tension between the Kansas Supreme Court and many political actors.213 This 
led to a frontal attack on the Court, as a number of conservative groups chal-
lenged the retention of four out of five justices in the November 2016 election.214 
However, a coalition of moderate Republicans, Democrats, businesses, and pro-
school groups backed the Court, and all the justices were retained with solid 
voter support.215 This strong showing for the justices echoed Washington’s ju-
dicial election results the same year and provided important institutional capital 
for the Kansas Supreme Court as it moved into the next rounds of Gannon.216  
The March 2017 case, Gannon IV,217 focused on the issue of funding ade-
quacy, holding that the most recent group of legislative changes were only “min-
imally responsive.”218 In June of that year, the legislature responded with the 
“Kansas School Equity and Enhancement Act” (KSEEA) aimed at comprehen-
sively changing the school funding system.219 The same legislature also changed 
the state’s income tax structure to increase revenue available for critical needs, 
including school operations.220 In October, the Kansas Supreme Court re-
sponded with Gannon V,221 holding that the KSEEA exacerbated wealth-based 
disparities among school districts222 and contributed to the further entrenchment 
of school underfunding.223 Nevertheless, the Court stayed its mandate through 
June 30, 2018 in order to enable the legislature to adjust the state’s funding 
mechanisms.224 This process was repeated again the following year with some 
progress; the 2018 legislature increased funding based on a new cost study.225 
In Gannon VI,226 the Court complemented lawmakers on the improvement and 
determined that the equity issues were finally resolved.227 However, the justices 
informed legislators that additional timely financial adjustments were necessary 
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to satisfy the constitution’s adequacy requirements.228 
As we saw in the Washington judicial elections discussed earlier, the 2016 
Kansas retention election results had strengthened the Court’s hand in the push 
for final resolution of the Gannon cases. The 2018 election similarly helped pro-
pel a final financial resolution. That year, voters opted for Democratic Governor 
Laura Kelly, whose election campaign stressed the need to resolve school fund-
ing litigation and comply with the Kansas Supreme Court’s requirements.229 De-
spite resistance from house Republicans, Governor Kelly worked with a bipar-
tisan coalition of senators to push through a funding package meant to finally 
end the Gannon saga.230 After an oral argument in which the justices expressed 
their frustration with the seemingly interminable litigation,231 Gannon VII, is-
sued in June 2019, found the state to be in substantial compliance with the state 
constitution’s adequacy requirements.232 The Court retained jurisdiction “to en-
sure continued implementation of the scheduled funding.”233 
In attempting to achieve legislative compliance with its constitutional deci-
sions on school funding, the Kansas Supreme Court faced the same challenges 
as the courts in Indonesia and Washington. Applying Young’s typology, the 
Kansas justices leaned toward a “managerial” approach, defining the character 
of the constitutional right and setting timelines for legislative implementation. 
At the same time, the Court would suggest potential measures in its considera-
tion to enforce compliance, before backing off and allowing the legislature more 
time to voluntarily comply—knowing that the legislators now had the alterna-
tive of judicially enforced compliance in the back of their mind. Richard E. 
Levy’s view is that the Court gradually improved its tactical skills, moving from 
an approach that Young would characterize as a peremptory approach in Mon-
toy, to what we might view as a managerial stance in the Gannon cases.234 In 
Gannon, the court often referred to legislatively-sponsored cost studies and em-
phasized less absolute expenditure levels, allowing for good faith attempts at 
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resolution of the issue by the legislative branch. Even after the 2016 election 
victories, the Kansas Supreme Court continued to prod the legislature—doing 
so firmly but without engaging in a peremptory approach that might result in 
stiffened and counterproductive legislative resistance. 
 
VII.   OBERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
In each of the three jurisdictions examined—Indonesia, Washington State, 
and Kansas—constitutional positive rights provisions were the basis of lengthy 
but successful litigation that substantially increased governmental funding of 
pre-college education. The tables below depict the gradual but substantial in-
crease in school funding over the course of the observed court cases. 
 
Education Funding Increases During Litigation 
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Perhaps the most noteworthy adjective to stress with regard to the above 
increases is gradual. Significant increases in state resources for education were 
achieved, but in each jurisdiction, executive and legislative actors did not jump 
to attention and immediately implement constitutional court rulings. As the 
judges in these cases were acutely aware, there was a “delicate balancing of 
powers and responsibilities among coordinate branches of government,”235 and 
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there was certainly no guarantee the political actors would follow judicial direc-
tives. 
Through the course of the examined litigation, the justices in these jurisdic-
tions tried most of the approaches Young’s work describes.236 Young’s typolo-
gies are useful in depicting the ways courts act when addressing positive rights 
enforcement. In her book, she describes what she sees as the predominant char-
acteristics of the national courts she studied: a “catalytic” South African court, 
a “supremacist” bench in Columbia, an “engaged” Indian court, and a tendency 
towards “detachment” in the United Kingdom.237 She also observes that judicial 
power is multidimensional and interactive,238 and this squares with our observa-
tions. We observed the Indonesian, Washington, and Kansas courts toggling 
back and forth between stances and modes. These courts would start out with 
one approach. Then, when legislators either ignored or responded slowly to the 
initial juridical modality, the courts would try something else—on occasion 
openly querying the parties about the content and limits of a court’s enforcement 
powers.239 Gradually the coordinate branches increased school budgets to levels 
that satisfied the reviewing courts. In part a testimony to the finitude of human 
perseverance in continued litigation, the courts and legislatures eventually tired 
of the endless litigative process and were willing to declare the school funding 
issued “solved” when the increases were sufficient enough.  
Based on the right-to-education-funding cases we studied, we found that 
Katharine Young’s model is most helpful in describing multiple modes of con-
stitutional court behavior in a politicized environment in which, regardless of 
judicial selection method, the justices were subject to removal either by the ex-
ecutive or by the voters. But the social scientists are especially helpful in ex-
plaining the ultimate success of these positive rights cases. Gauri and Brinks are 
right that judges “craft their opinions with an eye on the likelihood of compli-
ance . . . , the political reaction and its effect on the standing of the judiciary.”240 
Further, the legal, political, socioeconomic, and civil society variables described 
by Langford, Rodriguez-Garavito, and Rossi help explain the interactions when 
the judicial branch interfaces with its coordinate branches in positive rights sit-
uations.241 As to the germane legal variables, the strong language of the relevant 
rights provisions was quite significant. In terms of political and social variables, 
the Indonesian legislature was constrained by limited resources, while the two 
American legislatures were constrained first by a recession and then by a simple 
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unwillingness to raise taxes. Likewise, the civil society variables were not un-
important: in all three jurisdictions the petitioners were backed financially and 
politically by education advocacy groups and unions, and the cases would likely 
not have succeeded without that crucial support. This was especially true in 
Washington and Kansas, where this increased support urged sympathetic legis-
lators to collaborate strategically across party lines and with the case petitioners.  
Notwithstanding the political, social, and economic variables that affect ju-
dicial decision-making, the fact remains that most judges are not politicians. 
Whether judges come from a civil law or common law background, their culture 
is a legal rather than a political culture. While certainly interconnected, the re-
spective milieus of jurists and politicians are by no means the same. Judges fo-
cus on one case after another, considering and responding to technical legal ar-
guments raised by the parties and issuing decisions based on legal doctrines. 
They are accustomed to making decisions, issuing rulings, and having their or-
ders followed. When faced with strong, explicit education rights provisions (as 
in Indonesia and Washington State) or a moderately strong provision reinforced 
by a robust corpus of legal doctrine (as in Kansas, relying in large part on their 
endorsement of Kentucky law), their institutional and cultural background im-
pels them to behave as judges, not politicians. This lays the groundwork for in-
terbranch tension. Based on his study of the Kansas school finance cases, Rich-
ard E. Levy has observed that “there is an inherent cultural clash between courts 
and legislators: lawmakers are politicians and are looking for what is do-able 
and expedient, while courts apply principled deductive reasoning based on con-
stitutional norms, reasoning that leads to conclusions about actions that the 
judges expect to be carried out.”242  
The legal variables described by Langford, Rodriguez-Garavito, and Rossi 
are the ones with the most salience for judges: the wording of the constitutional 
language; the arguments presented by litigants; the traditions of a jurisdiction’s 
specific judicial culture; and the available remedies.243 Needless to say, the prac-
ticable remedies are often difficult for judges to discern, particularly when the 
vindication of a particular positive right requires the expenditure of money that 
is perennially in short supply. Education is expensive. Substantial increases in 
school funding require either increased tax revenue or cuts to other government 
programs. Elected officials are uncomfortable raising taxes and they cannot rely 
on their economies to consistently generate more revenue without rate increases. 
Of course, judges neither desire nor are well-equipped to make policy trade-offs. 
They are most comfortable operating in their natural, legalistic, deductive rea-
soning track, and that approach is not suited to the give-and-take of governing 
by compromise. In the jurisdictions and cases observed for this paper, each con-
stitutional court concentrated on legal reasoning and explanations in formal 
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opinions, while keeping an eye on the practicalities of enforcement and imple-
mentation. Members of the Washington Supreme Court have observed that as 
judges, they are reactive, responding to actions and solutions proposed by the 
parties; in the McCleary case the court acted cautiously and methodically be-
cause the plaintiffs did not propose drastic judicial actions and because the State 
gradually responded.244 
It is fair to say that in all three of the jurisdictions studied, the constitutional 
courts were “catalytic” as Young uses the term. The constitutional school fund-
ing cases in Indonesia, Washington, and Kansas were all launched by teachers’ 
unions and education organizations, groups that could simultaneously support 
lawsuits and lobby legislatures to promote compliance with court rulings. Those 
efforts were complemented by support from the media and, in the cases of Wash-
ington and Kansas, by voters at the polls. Consistent with the social scientists’ 
theories, we found that despite legislative foot-dragging, these catalytic courts 
forced education funding to remain at the top of the legislative agenda while 
education interest groups and the media successfully pushed the lawmakers to 
find the money so they could eventually comply with the court orders. 
 
 
 244 See Interviews with Washington Supreme Court Justices, supra note 152. 
